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Abstract 
The current study examined the relations between working memory capacity, attention control, and 
general fluid intelligence. Participants performed multiple measures of each construct and confirmatory 
factor analysis and structural equation modeling was used to analyze the data. The results suggested 
that attention control is an important component of the working memory and general fluid intelligence 
relation. Additionally, attention control accounted for unique variance in general fluid intelligence 
above and beyond working memory capacity. Consistent with the dual-component model of working 
memory, substantial independent variance was left over after accounting for attention control’s role in 
this relation. Therefore, other important mediating variables need to be accounted for to fully appreciate 
working memory’s ability to predict general fluid intelligence (e.g., retrieval from secondary memory). 
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Measures of working memory capacity such as reading span, operation span, symmetry 
span, and counting span, to name a few, have frequently been shown to predict performance 
on measures of intelligence and specifically on measures of fluid intelligence (e.g., Acker-
man, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Conway et al., 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 
1999; Kane et al., 2004; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). However, the reason for the relation 
between working memory capacity (WMC) and fluid intelligence (gF) is still not fully un-
derstood. Several theories have been proposed to account for this substantial relation, with 
some theories arguing for the importance of attention control (Engle & Kane, 2004), some 
theories arguing for the importance of the scope of attention (Cowan et al., 2005), some 
theories arguing for the importance of relational binding (Oberauer et al., 2007 ), some theo-
ries arguing for the importance of secondary memory processes (Mogle et al., 2008), and 
others arguing for a combination of attention control and controlled retrieval from memory 
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007). The aim of the current study was to examine whether attention 
control accounts for the relation between WMC and gF, or whether multiple sources of vari-
ance account for the relation. 
 
 
Working memory capacity, attention control, and fluid intelligence 
 
A number of studies by Engle, Kane, Conway, and colleagues (Engle & Kane, 2004; 
Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007) have suggested that individual differences in 
WMC really reflect differences in executive attention. That is, individual differences in 
WMC reflect underlying differences in the ability to control attention in order to maintain 
task or goal relevant information in a highly accessible or active state in situations where 
there is substantial internal and external distraction and interference. In particular, this view 
suggests that individuals high in WMC are better at controlling aspects of their attention to 
actively maintain goal relevant information in order to successfully perform a task than 
individuals low in WMC. Furthermore, these differences are especially pronounced under 
conditions of high interference or distraction in which attentional capture away from task or 
goal irrelevant information is likely. Thus, high WMC individuals are better at preventing 
interference or distraction than low WMC individuals and this attention control ability is 
needed in a host of activities regardless of specific stimulus or processing domains. 
As a case in point, take the antisaccade task. In this task participants are told to fixate at 
center and after a variable amount of time one of two boxes at either side of the screen is 
going flash. In the prosaccade version of this task, participants are instructed to simply look 
at the flashing box. In the antisaccade version, however, participants are instructed to not 
look at the flashing box, and instead to look at the box on the opposite side of the screen. 
According to the executive attention view of WMC, this task requires a great deal of atten-
tion control in order to maintain the task goal (e.g., “look away from the flash”) in the pres-
ence of a potent distractor that will likely capture attention. Thus, any lapse of attention in 
this task will likely lead to a loss of the task goal and will result in attention being automati-
cally captured by the cue leading to an error. In terms of individual differences in WMC, this 
means that high and low WMC individuals should not differ on relatively automatic prosac-
cades, but that low WMC individuals should make more errors on the attention demanding 
antisaccades. Results consistent with this prediction have been found in several studies (e.g., 
Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). In these N. Unsworth, G. J. Spillers & G. A. Brewer  390 
studies low WMC individuals consistently performed worse on the antisaccade task com-
pared to high WMC individuals. These results provide strong support for the executive atten-
tion view of WMC by suggesting that high and low WMC individuals differ in basic atten-
tion control abilities. 
Additional work examining WMC differences in a number of attention control paradigms 
has corroborated the executive attention account of WMC. For instance, recent work has 
demonstrated WMC differences in dichotic listening (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; 
Colflesh & Conway, 2007), Stroop interference (Kane & Engle, 2003; Long & Prat, 2002), 
flanker interference (Heitz & Engle, 2007; Redick & Engle, 2006), as well as differences in 
flexible visual attention allocation (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003). 
In each case, high WMC individuals were better at controlling aspects of their attention than 
low WMC individuals. Recently, Poole and Kane (2009; see also Kane et al., 2006) have 
suggested that these tasks can be usefully grouped into functional categories in which atten-
tion control is needed to restrain attention and prevent attentional capture from prepotent 
responses as in the antisaccade and Stroop tasks. In this view, attention control is also needed 
to constrain attention to specific objects or locations amongst other interfering distractor 
objects as in flanker tasks. Furthermore, attention control is also needed to sustain attention 
on task over lengthy periods in order to prevent lapses of attention to internal and external 
distractors (see for example Kane, Brown, et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009). According to 
Poole and Kane (2009), a common attention control mechanism is needed for these three 
aspects of attention (i.e., restrain, constrain, and sustain) and the common variance across 
these three aspects (or functions) of attention should be related to individual differences in 
WMC. 
In terms of the relation between WMC and gF, a strong version of this executive atten-
tion theory would suggest that the shared variance between WMC and gF should be fully 
accounted for by attention control. That is, individual differences in attention control should 
mediate the relation between WMC and gF. According to a strong version of the executive 
attention view, the reason for the substantial relation between WMC and gF is because of 
basic differences in the ability to control attention. Once variance in attention control is 
accounted for, there should no longer be any shared variance between WMC and gF. How-
ever, it should be noted that Kane et al., (2006) have suggested that attention control (or 
executive attention) may not fully mediate the relation between WMC and gF, given that 
other processes in addition to attention control may be important for the relation between 
WMC and gF. 
In regards to this latter point, we (Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Unsworth, Brewer, & 
Spillers, in press) have recently suggested a dual-component framework for interpreting 
individual differences in WMC. In this view, individual differences in WMC partially reflect 
differences in attention control abilities as noted above. In addition, individual differences in 
WMC also reflect differences in controlled retrieval abilities in which information that could 
not be maintained in the focus of attention (due to distraction and/or capacity constraints) has 
to be retrieved back into the focus via a cue-dependent search process (e.g., Shiffrin, 1970). 
Thus, high and low WMC individuals should differ not only on basic low level attention 
tasks that require attention to be restrained, constrained, or sustained, but also on more basic 
memory tasks where a controlled/strategic search of memory is needed to recover informa-
tion that could not be maintained. Similar to the fact that attention control abilities can be 
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of multiple functional components which high and low WMC individuals should differ on 
(Unsworth, 2008; Unsworth, in press). For instance, in line with search models in general 
(e.g., Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1980) we have suggested that a number of control processes 
operate at retrieval including setting up an appropriate retrieval plan, selecting cues/probes to 
engage in a strategic search, monitoring the outputs of the search process for accuracy, edit-
ing the products of the search based on correct and error responses, and deciding to continue 
or terminate search and WMC should be important for each of these memory processes to 
the extent that willful controlled search is needed for accurate task performance.  
In terms of the relation between WMC and gF, this dual-component framework suggests 
that part of the relation between WMC and gF is due to attention control abilities. Impor-
tantly, this view suggests that attention control should not fully mediate the relation between 
WMC and gF, given that additional processes (e.g., controlled retrieval) should also be im-
portant for the relation between WMC and gF. Thus, this view suggests that the shared vari-
ance between WMC and gF is due to at least two distinct sources of variance (attention 
control and controlled retrieval; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, in press) and suggests that it 
is possible that other distinct sources are important as well (e.g., scope of attention, binding 
operations, etc.). 
 
 
The present study 
 
The aim of the present study was to examine the relations between WMC, attention con-
trol, and gF. In particular, we examined whether attention control was related to WMC and 
gF and whether attention control would fully account for the shared variance between WMC 
and gF. As noted above, according to a strong version of the executive attention view, atten-
tion control should fully mediate the relation between WMC and gF (although see Kane et 
al., 2006), to the extent that the predictive power of WMC is localized to attention control 
abilities. However, the dual-component framework (Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Unsworth, 
Brewer, & Spillers, in press) suggests that part of the relation between WMC and gF should 
be accounted for by attention control, but that WMC should also predict unique variance in 
gF after controlling for attention control. As noted above, this prediction reflects the fact that 
attention control is only part of the reason for individual differences in WMC; other sources 
of differences such as controlled retrieval are also important and must be taken into account 
to fully understand the WMC-gF relation. 
As noted by Cowan et al., (2006), although the strong version of the executive attention 
theory suggests that attention control should mediate the relation between WMC and gF, 
relatively few studies have actually examined correlations among WMC, attention control, 
and gF. For instance, Cowan et al., (2006) found that a measure of the scope of attention 
(i.e., size of the focus of attention) and a measure of attention control both were correlated 
with intelligence, and both accounted for unique variance in intelligence. Furthermore, 
Schweizer, Moosbrugger, and Goldhammer (2005) found that latent variables derived from 
multiple attention control measures were related to gF, and that a single higher-order atten-
tion control factor accounted for 32% of the variance in gF. Similarly, examining latent 
attention control and WMC variables in the same study, Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) 
found that both attention control and WMC predicted gF as measured by the Raven Ad-
vanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). These results suggest that N. Unsworth, G. J. Spillers & G. A. Brewer  392 
attention control is related to intellectual functioning and accounts for some unique variance 
in gF even when WMC is taken into account. That is, both WMC and attention control seem 
to be related to gF and both account for unique variance. These results are consistent with 
the dual-component model of WMC in that attention control does not fully mediate the rela-
tion between WMC and gF as a strong version of the executive attention account would 
suggest. 
The goal of the present study was to build on these results and examine the extent to 
which attention control fully mediates the relation between WMC and gF, or whether both 
attention control and WMC account for some unique variance in gF. Although the Schweizer 
and Moosbrugger (2004) study provides initial evidence for this view, the current study 
builds on their work in two important ways. First, Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) found 
that both attention control and WMC accounted for unique variance in gF only when exam-
ining the Raven task as the criterion variable. Examining another measure of intelligence 
(the ZVT), Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) found that only attention control accounted 
for unique variance. Thus, it is unclear whether the unique variance accounted for by WMC 
was due to an idiosyncratic relationship with the Raven task or whether these results would 
generalize to a broader gF factor. Therefore, in the current study participants not only per-
formed a version of the Advanced Progressive Matrices, but also performed a version of 
number series (Thurstone, 1962), and an inductive verbal analogies test, in order to have a 
fairly broad gF factor composed of spatial, numerical, and verbal reasoning tasks.  
Second, the tasks used by Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) to represent WMC and at-
tention control are a bit different than the tasks used to examine the executive attention and 
dual-component accounts of WMC (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
Specifically, Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) used versions of the exchange test and the 
swaps test as their working memory measures, whereas previous work examining the execu-
tive attention and dual-component frameworks has almost exclusively relied on complex 
span tasks (reading span, operations span, etc.) to measure WMC. Although it is likely that 
these tasks are fundamentally related, it is an open question as to whether the relations found 
by Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) will be found with the complex span tasks. There-
fore, in the current study participants performed the reading span and operation span tasks, 
and these tasks were used as our measures of WMC.  
Additionally, Schweizer and Moosbrugger (2004) relied on primarily sustained attention 
tasks to measure attention control in their study, but as noted above, Poole and Kane (2009) 
have suggested that attention control is needed not only to sustain attention, but also to re-
strain and constrain attention. Therefore, in the current study we had participants not only 
perform a sustained attention task (the psychomotor vigilance task; Dinges & Powell, 1985), 
but participants also performed a task that required attentional restraint (the antisaccade 
task), and a task that required attentional constraint (the flanker task). In using these tasks we 
hoped to derive a broad attention factor that would capture the three important components 
of attention control as suggested by Poole and Kane (2009). Using these tasks we examined 
the relations among WMC, attention control, and gF, and the extent to which WMC and 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 155 participants (60% female) were recruited from the subject-pool at the Uni-
versity of Georgia. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 35 (M = 18.79, SD = 1.21) 
and received course credit for their participation. Each participant was tested individually in 
a laboratory session lasting approximately two hours. 
 
 
Materials and procedure 
 
After signing informed consent, all participants completed operation span, reading span, 
antisaccade, psychomotor vigilance, flankers, Raven, verbal analogies, and number series. 
All tasks were administered in the order listed above.  
 
 
Tasks 
 
Working memory capacity tasks 
Operation Span (Ospan). Participants solved a series of math operations while trying to 
remember a set of unrelated letters (F, H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, Y). Participants were 
required to solve a math operation and after solving the operation they were presented with a 
letter for 1 s. Immediately after the letter was presented the next operation was presented. 
Three trials of each list-length (3-7) were presented for a total possible of 75. The order of 
list-length varied randomly. At recall, letters from the current set were recalled in the correct 
order by clicking on the appropriate letters (see Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005 
for more details). Participants received three sets (of list-length two) of practice. For all of 
the span measures, items were scored if the item was correct and in the correct position. The 
score was the proportion of correct items in the correct position.  
Reading span (Rspan). Participants were required to read sentences while trying to re-
member the same set of unrelated letters as Ospan. For this task, participants read a sentence 
and determined whether the sentence made sense or not (e.g. “The prosecutor’s dish was lost 
because it was not based on fact. ?”). Half of the sentences made sense while the other half 
did not. Nonsense sentences were made by simply changing one word (e.g. “dish” from 
“case”) from an otherwise normal sentence. Participants were required to read the sentence 
and to indicate whether it made sense or not. After participants gave their response they were 
presented with a letter for 1 s. At recall, letters from the current set were recalled in the cor-
rect order by clicking on the appropriate letters. There were three trials of each list-length 
with list-length ranging from 3–7 for a total possible of 75. The same scoring procedure as 
Ospan was used. 
 
Attention control tasks 
Antisaccade. In this task (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001) participants were in-
structed to stare at a fixation point which was onscreen for a variable amount of time (200-
2200 ms). A flashing white “=” was then flashed either to the left or right of fixation (11.33° N. Unsworth, G. J. Spillers & G. A. Brewer  394 
of visual angle) for 100 ms. This was followed by the target stimulus (a B, P, or R) onscreen 
for 100 ms. This was followed by masking stimuli (an H for 50 ms and an 8 which remained 
onscreen until a response was given). The participants’ task was to identify the target letter 
by pressing a key for B, P, or R (the keys 1, 2, or 3) as quickly and accurately as possible. In 
the prosaccade condition the flashing cue (=) and the target appeared in the same location. In 
the antisaccade condition the target appeared in the opposite location as the flashing cue. 
Participants received, in order, 10 practice trials to learn the response mapping, 15 trials of 
the prosaccade condition, and 60 trials of the antisaccade condition. The dependent variable 
was proportion correct on the antisaccade trials.  
Arrow flankers. Participants were presented with a fixation point for 400 ms. This was 
followed by an arrow directly above the fixation point for 1700 ms. The participants’ task 
was to indicate the direction the arrow was pointing (pressing the F for left pointing arrows 
and pressing J for right pointing arrows) as quickly and accurately as possible. On 50 neutral 
trials the arrow was flanked by two horizontal lines on each side. On 50 congruent trials the 
arrow was flanked by two arrows pointing in the same direction as the target arrow on each 
side. Finally, on 50 incongruent trials the target arrow was flanked by two arrows pointing in 
the opposite direction as the target arrow on each side. All trial types were randomly inter-
mixed. The dependent variable was the reaction time difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials. 
Psychomotor Vigilance Task (PVT). The psychomotor vigilance task (Dinges & Powell, 
1985) was used as the primary measure of sustained attention. Participants were presented 
with a row of zeros (i.e., 00.000) on screen indicating seconds and milliseconds. After a 
variable amount of time the zeros began to count up in 1 ms intervals from 0 ms. The par-
ticipants’ task was to press the spacebar as quickly as possible once the numbers started 
counting up. After pressing the spacebar the RT was left on screen for 1 s to provide feed-
back to the participants. Interstimulus intervals were randomly distributed and ranged from 1 
to 10s. The entire task lasted for 10 minutes for each individual (roughly 75 total trials). The 
dependent variable was the average reaction time for the slowest 20% of trials (Dinges & 
Powell, 1985). 
 
Fluid intelligence (gF) tasks 
Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices. The Raven is a measure of abstract reasoning 
(Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). The test consists of 36 items presented in ascending order of 
difficulty (i.e. easiest – hardest). Each item consists of a display of 3 x 3 matrices of geomet-
ric patterns with the bottom right pattern missing. The task for the participant is to select 
among eight alternatives, the one that correctly completes the overall series of patterns. 
Participants had 10 minutes to complete the 18 odd-numbered items. A participant’s score 
was the total number of correct solutions. Participants received two practice problems. 
Number Series. In this task participants saw a series of numbers and were required to de-
termine what the next number in the series should be (Thurstone, 1962). That is, the series 
follows some unstated rule which participants are required to figure out in order to determine 
which the next number in the series should be. Participants selected their answer out of five 
possible numbers that were presented. Following five practice items, participants had 4.5 
minutes to complete 15 test items. A participant’s score was the total number of items solved 
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Verbal analogies. In this task participants read an incomplete analogy and were required 
to select the one word out of five possible words that best completed the analogy. After one 
practice item, participants had 5 minutes to complete 18 test items. These items were origi-
nally selected from the Air Force Officer Qualifying Test (AFOQT; Berger, Gupta, Berger, 
& Skinner, 1990), and we used the same subset of items used in Kane et al. (2004). A par-
ticipant’s score was the total number of items solved correctly. 
 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, the measures had generally acceptable values of internal con-
sistency and most of the measures were approximately normally distributed with values of 
skewness and kurtosis under the generally accepted values (i.e., skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 
4; see Kline, 1998). Correlations, shown in Table 2, were weak to moderate in magnitude. It 
should be noted that despite the weak nature of these correlations, they are similar in magni-
tude to similar correlations that have been found for WMC and attention control variables in 
previous studies (e.g., Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Unsworth et al., in press). It is likely that 
the weak magnitude of the correlations was due in part to the fact that the current sample of 
participants tended to be high ability participants (Detterman & Daniel, 1989; Spearman, 
1927). 
Next, we used confirmatory factor analysis to test several measurement models of the 
three constructs of interest. Model 1 tested a single factor model in which all of the tasks 
loaded onto a single factor. The fit of the model was acceptable, χ
2 (20) = 36.99, p < .05, 
RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .07, NNFI = .88, CFI = .91, AIC = 68.99. Model 2 tested a two-
factor model in which the WMC and attention control tasks loaded onto a single factor and 
the gF tasks loaded onto another factor. These two factors were allowed to correlate. The fit  
 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates for all measures 
 
Measure M  SD  Skew  Kurtosis  Reliability 
Ospan 64.01  7.25  -.72  -.03 .79 
Rspan 60.55  9.19  -.62  -.16  .81 
Anti .54  .12  .31  -.64  .69 
Flanker  103.21 45.99  2.02 10.40  -- 
PVT 519.65  130.47  1.76  4.65  .97 
Raven 10.21  2.66  -.42  .45 .66 
NS 9.65  2.54  .11  -.85  .71 
Analogy 7.32  2.45  -.27  -.46  .68 
Note. Ospan = operation span; Rspan = reading span; Anti = antisaccade; Flanker = 
arrow flankers; PVT = psychomotor vigilance task; Raven = Raven Advanced 
Progressive Matrices; NS = number series; Analogy = verbal analogies; -- = reliability 
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Table 2: 
Correlations for all measures.  
 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Ospan  --        
2.  Rspan  .57  --       
3.  Anti  .05  .12  --      
4.  Flanker  -.18  -.13  -.25  --     
5. PVT  -.13  -.25  -.17  .17  --       
6.  Raven  .20  .26  .15 -.20 -.12  --     
7.  NS  .17  .20  .16 -.12 -.23  .20  --   
8.  Analogy .18 .35 .08  -.13  -.10 .23 .18  -- 
Note. Ospan = operation span; Rspan = reading span; Anti = antisaccade; Flanker = 
arrow flankers; PVT = psychomotor vigilance task; Raven = Raven Advanced 
Progressive Matrices; NS = number series; Analogy = verbal analogies.  
 
 
of the model was acceptable, χ
2 (19) = 31.95, p < .05, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .07, NNFI = 
.90, CFI = .93, AIC = 65.95. Model 3 tested a three factor model, one for WMC, one for 
attention control, and one for gF. The WMC factor was composed of the operation and read-
ing span tasks, while the attention control factor was composed of the antisaccade task, the 
flanker task, and the psychomotor vigilance tasks. Finally, the gF factor was composed of 
the Raven, number series, and verbal analogies. All three factors were allowed to correlate. 
The fit of this model was good, χ
2 (17) = 13.95, p > .67, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04, NNFI 
= 1.0, CFI = 1.0, AIC = 51.95. Importantly, the fit of this model was significantly better than 
either Model 1 or Model 2, both Δ χ
2‘s > 18, p’s < .01. This suggests that WMC, attention 
control, and gF can be considered as three separate, yet related constructs. The resulting 
model is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, each of the measures loaded significantly on 
their construct of interest and each of the latent variables were correlated with one another.  
In order to examine the question of primary interest we used structural equation model-
ing. Specifically, as noted previously, a strong version of the attention control view of WMC 
would suggest that attention control should fully mediate the relation between WMC and gF 
(although see Kane et al., 2006). In contrast, the dual-component framework suggests that 
attention control should account for a substantial amount of the shared variance between 
WMC and gF, but that WMC should still predict gF even when controlling for attention 
control given that other processes (such as secondary memory search) are also important. 
Therefore, we specified a structural equation model in which both WMC and attention con-
trol predicted gF and WMC and attention control were allowed to correlate. If the attention 
control view is correct, then attention control should have a direct effect on gF, but WMC 
should not. Rather, the relation between WMC and gF should be mediated through attention 
control. On the other hand, if WMC has a direct effect on gF, then its path to gF should be 
significant even with the path from attention control to gF freed, and fixing the path from 
WMC to gF should result in poorer model fit.  
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Figure 1: 
Measurement model for working memory capacity (WMC), general fluid intelligence (gF), and 
attention control (AC). Paths connecting latent variables (circles) to each other represent the 
correlations between the constructs, the numbers from the latent variables to the manifest 
variables (squares) represent the loadings of each task onto the latent variable, and numbers 
appearing next to each manifest variable represent error variance associated with each task. 
Ospan = operation span; Rspan = reading span; Raven = Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices; 
NS = number series: Analogy = verbal analogies; anti = antisaccade; flanker = arrow flanker; 
PVT = psychomotor vigilance task. All paths and loadings were significant at the p < .05 level 
 
 
Shown in Figure 2 is the resulting model. As can be seen, both WMC and attention con-
trol had direct effects on gF with both paths being significant. Furthermore, the fit of the 
model was good (and technically the same as the measurement model given the same covari-
ance structure), χ
2 (17) = 13.95, p > .67, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04, NNFI = 1.0, CFI = 
1.0, AIC = 51.95. Importantly, fixing either the path from WMC to gF, or the path from 
attention control to gF to zero resulted in a significantly poorer fit, both Δ χ
2’s > 4.5, p’s < 
.05. Thus, although attention control significantly predicted gF as attention control views of 
WMC would suggest, attention control did not fully mediate the relation between WMC and 
gF. Rather, WMC also had a direct effect on gF even when taking into account attention 
control. 
As argued previously, the dual-component framework of WMC suggests that the shared 
variance between WMC and gF after controlling for attention control likely reflects secon-
dary memory retrieval processes (as well as other possible processes) that are needed in gF 
tasks independently of attention control. As a further test of this notion, we specified another 
structural equation model in which the attention control latent variable was composed of the  
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Figure 2: 
Structural equation model for working memory capacity (WMC) and attention control (AC) 
predicting fluid intelligence (gF). All paths and loadings were significant at the p < .05 level 
 
 
variance common to the three attention control tasks and the two complex spans (the logic 
being that all WMC and attention control tasks are influenced by attention control proc-
esses). The WMC latent variable was composed of the common variance shared between the 
complex spans independent of the shared variance with the attention control tasks. The cor-
relation between these two factors was constrained to zero and both were allowed to predict 
gF. Thus, this model tests the notion that WMC measures are composed of at least two sepa-
rate sources of variance, both of which are related to gF (see also Unsworth, Brewer, & 
Spillers, in press).  
The fit of this model was good, χ
2 (16) = 13.81, p > .61, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04, NNFI 
= 1.0, CFI = 1.0, AIC = 53.81. As shown in Figure 3, the WMC measures significantly cross-
loaded on both the attention control and WMC factors as expected. Furthermore, both the 
common attention control factor and the independent WMC factor significantly predicted gF. 
Given that the correlation of these two factors was set to zero, this means that both the common 
attention control factor and the independent WMC factor accounted for unique variance in gF. 
In fact, collectively these two factors accounted for 65% of the variance in gF. The common 
attention control factor accounted for 49% of the variance and the independent WMC factor 
accounted for 16% of the variance. Thus, at least two sources of variance are important in ac-
counting for the shared variance between WMC and gF. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: 
Structural equation model for the common variance shared across the working memory capacity 
and attention control tasks (AC) and the independent variance common to only the working 
memory capacity tasks (WMC) predicting fluid intelligence (gF). All paths and loadings were 
significant at the p < .05 level WMC, attention control, and gF  399 
Discussion 
 
The current study examined the relations among WMC, attention control, and gF from a 
latent variable perspective. Participants performed multiple measures of WMC, multiple 
measures of attention control (i.e., measures of restrained, constrained, and sustained atten-
tion), and multiple measures of gF. Consistent with attention control views of WMC (Engle 
& Kane, 2004) it was found that WMC, attention control, and gF were all moderately related 
to one another. Using structural equation modeling it was found that both attention control 
and WMC significantly predicted gF. Fixing either of these paths to zero resulted in poorer 
model fit. These results are consistent with prior work suggesting that attention control is 
related to intelligence (Schweizer, Moosbrugger, & Goldhammer, 2005) and that both atten-
tion control and WMC account for unique variance in intelligence (Schweizer & Moosbrug-
ger, 2004). Thus, consistent with attention control views of WMC, attention control was a 
significant predictor of gF. However, inconsistent with strong versions of the attention con-
trol view, attention control did not fully mediate the relation between WMC and gF. 
A subsequent structural equation model in which one factor was composed of the vari-
ance common to all the attention control and WMC tasks, and another factor was composed 
of only the WMC tasks was also tested. This model suggested that much of the variance 
shared between WMC and gF was accounted for by common attention control processes that 
are needed in WMC, attention control, and gF tasks. This model also suggested that the 
independent WMC factor predicted variance in gF independent of that accounted for by the 
common factor (i.e., attention control). Thus, processes other than just attention control are 
important for the shared variance between WMC and gF. 
These results are consistent with a dual-component framework of WMC (Unsworth & 
Engle, 2007), suggesting that at least two sources of variance (attention control and secon-
dary memory) account for much of the shared variance between WMC and gF. That is, this 
framework suggests that attention control is an important component of WMC and a major 
reason for its predictive power, but at the same time the framework suggests that it is not the 
sole reason for the relation between WMC and gF. Rather, in this framework other processes 
such as controlled retrieval from secondary memory are also important. Thus, this view 
suggests that attention control should not fully account for the relationship between WMC 
and gF, rather there should be some shared variance between WMC and gF that is independ-
ent of the shared variance with attention control. The results of the current study are clearly 
consistent with this framework and suggest that at least two sources of variance are impor-
tant in accounting for the shared relation between WMC and gF (e.g., Unsworth, Brewer, & 
Spillers, in press). Other possible sources of variance include size or scope of the focus of 
attention (Cowan et al., 2006), binding operations (Oberauer,  Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 
2007), as well as updating and attention switching operations (Oberauer, 2002; Unsworth & 
Engle, 2008). 
Overall, these results point to the multifaceted nature of WMC and suggest that the pre-
dictive power of WMC is multiply determined. Consistent with prior theorizing (Engle & 
Kane, 2004), a great deal of the predictive power of WMC is due to variance shared with 
attention control measures such as antisaccade, Stroop, flanker, and psychomotor vigilance. 
At the same time, this is not the whole story. Other sources of variance such as retrieval from 
secondary memory, size of the focus of attention, binding operations, and updating are also 
critical to understanding the WMC-gF relation. To fully understand the WMC-gF relation N. Unsworth, G. J. Spillers & G. A. Brewer  400 
we need to examine multiple sources of variance, rather than just looking for a unitary 
source. 
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